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PRODUCTS LIABILITY AND PRIVITY
In recent years many authorities have criticized the requirement
of privity, questioning its utility in light of modern merchan-
dising practices and the needs of ultimate consumers. . . However,
... such arguments should properly have been addressed to the legis-
lature .... Whether the legislature, by its enactment of the Uniform
Commercial Code with the desire to simplify, clarify, and modernize
the law governing commercial transactions, has afforded us an op-
portunity to pass upon the necessity of privity. . .we need not now
decide.'
Warranties have been described as both contractual in nature,2 and
as sounding in tort.3 Consequently, a party defending may allege that a
warranty is contractual, and that there can be no liability without
privity ;4 or he may allege that the acount sounds in tort to obtain the
benefit of a tort statute of limitations.5 Conversely, a plaintiff may al-
lege that the action sounds in tort to avoid problems of privity,6 or allege
a contractual relationship to avoid a tort statute of limitations.7
SIMILARITY TO CONTRACT: PRIVITY REQUIREMENTS
The contractual nature of warranty is most apparent in the appli-
cation of the privity doctrine, which is not generally considered in a
negligence action.8  Winterbottom v. W1 right established the privity doc-
trine in warranty law by holding that a supplier of a defective product
was liable only to those with whom he had a contractual relationship.9
Courts soon recognized the harshness of this doctrine and began making
exceptions on numerous legal theories. As a result, the privity doctrine
as applied to warranty actions not only varies from state to state, but is
often inconsistently applied within a single state.10
Much of the chaos results from the language used to justify the ex-
ceptions. As one court so aptly stated: ". . .awesome have been the se-
mantic bogs when courts attempted to get around a harsh rule by arti-
ficial means. A court which lacks a clear and understandable rule of its
own can scarcely be expected to impart it to others."'1 This disorder be-
'Jangula v. United States Rubber Company, 147 Mont. 98, 410 P.2d 426 (1966).
'Seaton Ranch Co. v. Montana Vegetable Oil and Feed Co., 123 Mont. 396, 217 P.2d
549 (1949) (dissenting opinion).
'Rogers v. Toni Home Permanent Co., 167 Ohio 244, 147 N.E.2d 612 (1958).
4Winterbottom v. Wright, 10 M. & W. 109, 11 L.J.Ex. 415 (1842).
'Gardiner v. Philadelphia Gas Works, 413 Pa. 415, 197 A.2d 612 (1964).
'Kelley v. John R. Daily Co., 56 Mont. 63, 181 Pac. 326 (1919) ; Bolitho v. Safeway
Stores Inc., 109 Mont. 213, 95 P.2d 443 (1939). In these cases the plaintiff "spread
his shots" alleging both tort and breach of warranty.
7Gardiner v. Philadelphia Gas Works, supra note 5.
'I FRUMER & FRIEDMAN, PRODUCTS LIABILITY, § 5.03 (1).
'Winterbottom v. Wright, supra note 4.
"Inconsistency within the states is most apparent when food products are involved
because states will then abrogate the privity requirements, but if other products are
involved, they may not. Annot. 75 A.L.R.2d 39 (1961).
"Spence v. Three Rivers Builders and Masonry Supply, 353 Mich. 120, 90 N.W.2d 873,
877 (1958).
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comes most apparent when the cases are analyzed. Courts have used at
least twenty-nine separate legal thories to support decisions creating
excetions to the privity requirement.1 2  This prolixity makes it prac-
tically impossible to classify the exceptions.
States recognizing the general contract rationale may deny recovery
unless there is a contractual relationship. However, not all jurisdictions
restrict this relationship to the contracting parties. The effect is to limit
the strictness of the requirement of privity. Two Pennsylvania cases,
Ilochgertel v. Canada Dry Corp.,1 3 and Yentzer v. Taylor Wine Company,14
illustrate differences in application of the privity doctrine. The facts in
both cases were strikingly similar. During the course of employment
both plaintiffs were injured by an exploding bottle. In Ilochgertel,
recovery was denied because there was no privity between the employee
and the bottler. But in Yentzer, the court held that the privity require-
ment had been met because the plaintiff had personally contracted to buy
the beverage; therefore, he was a "buyer" even though the purchase was
made in his capacity as an employee. In fact the "buyer's" contract was
not with the defendant winery; it was with a liquor store, which in turn
had purchased the wine from the defendant. Consequently, the plaintiff
was not a party to the original sales contract, but a sub-purchaser.
Nevertheless, the court held that a contractual relationship "within the
distributive chain' 5 would link the prime seller and the sub-purchaser
and establish the necessary privity.
Warranties have been extended between such diverse parties as an
airline passenger and an airplane manufacturer, 16 a factory employee
and an industrial supplier, 7 and a truck driver and a tire manufacturer.8
Extension of warranties to other than the contracting parties can be
rationalized by reasoning that the additional parties are implied by law as
being included within the scope of the warranties. Nevertheless, it is
apparent that warranties differ from ordinary contracts in that ex-
clusions and modifications are limited by law, and warranties are ex-
tended to other parties through operation of law rather than by con-
sensual agreement.' 9
2GILLAM, PRODUCTS LIABILITY IN THE AUTOMOBILE INDUSTRY, 59-60 (1960).
1409 Pa. 610, 187 A.2d 575 (1963).
14414 Pa. 272, 199 A.2d 463 (1964).
"1Id. at 464. Eliminating privity within the distributive chain would also eliminate
unnecessary trials. Unless privity is eliminated, the ultimate consumer would have
to sue his supplier who, in turn, would have to bring another action against the one
who supplied him. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-314, 8 specifies that one who
buys for resale is protected by the warranty of merchantibility. (UNIFORM COM-
MERCIAL CODE is hereinafter cited U.C.C.)
"oGoldberg v. Kollsman Instrument Co., 240 N.Y.S. 592, 191 N.E.2d 81 (1963).
1TJakubowski v. Minnesota Mining & Manufacturing, 42 N.J. 177, 199 A.2d 826 (1964)
(reversed on other grounds).
"Dagley v. Armstrong Rubber Co., 344 F.2d 245 (7th Cir. 1965).
"-U.C.C. §§ 2-316, 2-318.
[Vol. 28
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NOTES
SIMILARITY TO TORT
Tort defenses such as assumption of risk, contributory negligence,
and proximate cause are often used in warranty actions. 20 Proximate
cause is used in the sense of foreseeability 2' rather than cause in fact.
This means that the seller does not have to foresee a particular chain of
events causing damage, but he must foresee that when his product is
used in a contemplated manner, a breach of warranty could result in
injury. For example, an implied warranty that food products shall be
pure and harmless 22 would render a seller liable for purveying a ham con-
taining buckshot if the buyer broke his tooth eating the ham. However,
the seller would not be liable if the extra weight of the buckshot caused
the buyer to drop the ham and break his toe. Although the seller should
foresee that injury could result from eating impure food, he could not
foresee harm from handling impure food; therefore, in the second case
the breach of warranty would not be the proximate cause of the injury.
Courts often allow contributory negligence as a defense in warranty
actions. However,
. . .it is arguably the better view that contributory negligence as
such, as distinguished from misuse of the product, is not a defense.
Depending upon the facts, the distinction between contributory negli-
gence and misuse of the product may be nothing more than a matter
of semantics. In other words, some courts have talked of contribu-
tory negligence as a defense in warranty when they could have said
instead that there was misuse or voluntary and unnecessary exposure
to risk with knowledge of the danger, which generally is a defense
to strict liability.23
The proponents of the above view recognize that their position does
not square with those cases denying recovery when the contributory
negligence was failure to reasonably inspect, when inspection would have
revealed a defective product.2 4 Failure to inspect may be contributory
negligence in a limited sense, but the failure goes to the buyer's knowl-
edge rather than to the buyer's use of the product which contributed to
the accident.2 5
In food cases, courts look to the product, not the parties, because
placing food on the market creates a duty to see that such food is fit and
merchantable. Thus, a breach of warranty sounds in tort rather than
in contract, and courts which treat warranty as strictly contractual in
nature often eliminate the privity requirement when a food product is
involved. 26 The extension of warranties to all food consumers is based on
public policy. The consequences of eating impure and unwholesome food
"ANNOT., 4 A.L.R. 3rd 501 (1965).
-U.C.C. § 2-715, comment 5.
-'REVISED CODES OF MONTANA, 1947, § 87A-314 (1). (THE REVISED CODES OF MONTANA
are hereinafter cited R.C.M.)
nFRUMER, op. cit. supra note 8, § 16.01(3).
24Ibid.
'Ibid.
'Annot., 75 A.L.R.2d 39 (1961).
.1.967]
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are so disastrous that the public interest is best served by allowing the
ultimate consumer an action in warranty regardless of privity. Thus,
defective food is felt to be less likely to reach the market place if the seller
is liable for the consequences. 27
In 1960, New Jersey extended the public policy rationale to non-food
cases in Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors.28 The court there stated:
We see no rational doctrinal basis for differentiating between a fly
in a bottle of beverage and a defective automobile. The unwholesome
beverage may bring illness to one person; the defective car, with
its great potentiality for harm to the driver, occupants, and others,
demands even less adherence to the narrow barrier of privity.29
The decision was based principally on the public policy of risk distribu-
tion, rather than deterrent effect. The court reasoned that because of the
increasing complexity of our economy, the manufacturer and ultimate
consumer no longer meet face to face in the market. As a consequence,
the implied warranty should run with the goods to protect those persons
reasonably expected to use the product. By placing the burden on the
manufacturer, who can control the quality of the goods, the manufac-
turer in turn can make an equitable distribution of loss through price
adjustments or insurance. Because the loss is "produced by the hazards
of a defendant's enterprise, . . .the risk of loss is properly a risk of that
enterprise.130
The theory of allocating the risk to the enterprise has been criticized
as overly broad. One court stated it could be applied not only to sales,
but to any of the seller's activities which produce risks. "Thus a manu-
facturer would be strictly liable, even in the absence of fault, for an in-
jury to a person struck by one of the manufacturer's trucks being used
in transporting his good to market."'3'
Regardless of which rationale, deterrent or risk allocation is used,
an increasing number of jurisdictions are examining the product to deter-
mine whether warranty should be extended. And, when a food product
or extremely dangerous non-food product is involved, it is probable that
lack of privity will not bar a warranty action.32 In effect, this is strict
liability, based on warranty, since the seller is liable for the foreseeable
damage resulting from the sale of a defective product. The classical con-
cept of strict liability in tort law holds that one is absolutely liable for
any harm resulting from an ultra-hazardous instrument in his control.
3
Strict liability in the warranty area is not this comprehensive, even
nSupra at 71-80.
-32 N.J. 358, 161 A.2d 69, 75 A.L.R.2d 1 (1960).
'Id. 161 A.2d at 84.
'James, General Products-Should Manufacturers be Liable Without Negligence? 24
TENN. L. REV. 923, 926 (1957).
"Wights v. Staff Jennings, Inc., 405 P.2d 624 (Ore. 1965).
82Supra note 10.
'Rylands v. Fletcher, L.R. 3 H. L. 330, 37 L.J.Ex. 161 (1868).
[Vol. 28
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though it allows recovery without proof of negligence. In warranty, the
plaintiff need not prove negligence; but he must show that the defendant
sold a defective product, and that this product was the proximate cause
of plaintiff's injury. It is erroneous to consider strict warranty liability
to be the same as the traditional tort concept of strict liability. It is
more analagous to an action based on negligence per se.
The court found reliance on an express warranty as a basis for
liability in Ford Motor Co. v. Loman.34 Loman purchased a Ford tractor
from a local dealer, relying on the manufacturer's advertising in making
the purchase. The court found that the advertisements created express
warranties which created a duty on the part of the manufacturers to
purchasers relying on them. Ford was held liable in tort, although liability
was based on breach of warranty rather than negligence. Logically, the
same reasoning should apply to implied warranties; dicta in the Loman
case so indicates. Further, the court stated that it would not be neces-
sary to show reliance when a defective product is placed on the market
which is unreasonably dangerous to potential users, saying ". . .the manu-
facturer should incur a strict liability in tort, apart from any warranties
or representation which he may have made.1
3 5
Under the Restatement of Torts (Second), one who sells a defective
product is liable for any resulting personal damage.36 And because the
action is in tort rather than in contract, it is "not subject to the various
contract rules which have grown up to surround sales.
3 7
The article "must be dangerous to an extent beyond which would be
contemplated by the ordinary consumer who purchases it with the or-
dinary knowledge common to the community as to its characteristics. '"38
Although there is a duty to warn of dangers, this is not necessary in the
case of a product which may cause an allergic reaction if the reaction
is well-known and common to widely distributed goods such as straw-
berries.3 9 Nor is there a duty to warn when the danger arising from con-
suming a particular product is generally known and recognized ;40 i.e.,
trichinosis from uncooked pork. Strict liability is not created by the
justifiable sale of unavoidably dangerous products. Although the Re-
statement uses rabies vaccination as an example, 4' the rule would seem
equally applicable to blood for transfusions.
The Restatement, in contrast to the Uniform Commercial Code, does
not allow as a defense the negligent failure to inspect. 42 This position is
"1398 S.W.2d 240 (Tenn. 1966).
"Id. at 251.
31RESTATEMENT (SECOND) TORTS § 402A (1966).
71d. at comment m.
id. at comment i.
11Id. at comment j.
4OIbid.
'Id. at comment k.
11Id. at comment n. This comment should be read in conjunction with the rule that
the article must be dangerous to an extent beyond which would be contemplated by
1.967] NOTES
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consistent with the Restatement's concept of strict liability, justified by
the public policy that one who consumes is entitled to protection, and
that those who market are the proper parties to provide this protection.4 3
Some cases have extended the Restatement's rationale to include such
non-users as casual bystanders.44
WARRANTY AND THE UNIFORM COMERCIAL CODE
The Uniform Commercial Code describes express warranties as those
arising from actual promises made by the seller,45 whereas implied war-
ranties of merchantability and of fitness of purpose arise through opera-
tion of law.
46
Warranties of merchantability guarantee that goods which are pur-
chased from a merchant customarily dealing in that product shall be of
fair average qualitv 47 Warranties of fitness of purpose do not dis-
tinguish between merchants and other sellers, but require that the goods
shall be fit for a particular purpose if the buyer relies on the seller's skill
and judgment. The seller must either have the buyer's reliance made
known to him,48 or from the circumstances of the transaction should
realize that such reliance exists. 49 The two implied warranties, although
separate, often overlap and both can be created by a single sale.50 For
example, a pair of trousers made of flammable material would breach
the warranty of merchantability because they were not of fair average
quality; the warranty of fitness would be breached because the seller
knew the article was purchased for clothing, and that the buyer relied
on his skill and judgment to select clothes which were not inherently
dangerous. When both implied warranties are present, they "shall be
construed as consistent with each other and as cumulative,"51 and in the
event of conflict, "any question of fact as to which warranty was in-
tended by the parties to apply must be resolved in favor of the warranty
of fitness for a particular purpose. .. 52
the ordinary consumer who purchases it with the ordinary knowledge common to the
community as to its characteristics. (See comment i, supra note 38). See also Web-
ster v. Blue Ship Tea Room Inc., 347 Mass. 421, 198 N.E.2d 309 (1964), holding no
liability when a New Englander was injured by fish bones in a chowder.
"RESTATEMENT (SECOND) TORTS § 402A (1966), comment c.
14Mitchell v. Miller, 26 Conn.Supp. 142, 214 A.2d 694 (1965); Piereefield v. Reming-
ton Arms Co., 375 Mich. 85, 133 N.W.2d 129 (1965).
"R.C.M. 1947, § 87A-2-313.
"R.C.M. 1947, §§ 87A-2-313-315.
4
'R.C.M. 1947, § 87A-2-314.
"-R.C.M. 1947, § 87A-2-315.
"U.C.C. § 2-315, comment 1.
ZBrown v. Chapman, 198 F.Supp. 78 (D. Hawaii 1961) aff'd 304 F.2d 149 (9th Cir.
1962). It has been held that not even a sale is necessary. See Garthwait v. Burgio,
216 A.2d 189 (Conn. 1965), (injuries for faulty application of hair dye); Cintrone
v. Hertz Truck Leasing, 45 N.J. 434, 212 A.2d 769 (1965), (lessor of truck held
liable to lessee's employee).
"R.C.M. 1947, § 87A-2-317.
6
2U.C.C. § 2-315, comment 2, referring also to § 2-317.
[Vol. 28
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Warranty liability arises when damage is caused by the failure of a
product to meet the express or implied representations made by the
seller.5 3 "The whole purpose of the law of warranty is to determine what
it is that the seller in essence agreed to sell. . .54 The seller is liable in
any manner which is reasonable 55 if the product does not conform to the
warranty. Three elements necessary to establish liability under the
Code are: (1) existence of the warranty; (2) breach of the warranty;
and (3) that the breach was the proximate cause of the loss sustained. 6
Because the breach is proved by showing a defective product, the product
itself is the best evidence. However, circumstantial evidence equivalent
to a preponderance of probabilities is also acceptable to prove breach.-W
The Code recognizes failure to inspect as a defense to a warranty
action.5 8 However, the standard of inspection is one of reasonableness
under the circumstances, rather than an absolute duty to inspect. The
buyer's conduct should be a defense to a warranty action only if it
amounts to a misuse of the product, and is a cause in fact of the injury.
This proposition may be illustrated by a defective tire. The seller should
be liable for breach of warranty if the buyer did not discover, or should
not have discovered the defect. The liability would remain even if the
tire were to blow out while the driver was exceeding the speed limit,
because the harm would have been caused by the defective tire, not by
the driver's negligence.5 9
Another means of limiting warranty liability is the use of disclaimer
clauses. The Code recognizes and distinguishes two separate disclaimers;
one modifies damages,60 and the other negates any warranty liability.61
The latter is a true disclaimer because it excludes warranty. The dif-
ference between the two types may be shown by a new car warranty
stating that the automobile shall be free from defects in material and
workmanship for twenty-four months, and that the obligation of the
seller shall be fulfilled by repairing or replacing any defective part. The
disclaimer clause provides that the warranty is in lieu of any other ex-
press or implied warranty, including any implied warranties of merchant-
IFRUMER, Op. cit. supra note 8, § 16.01.
1U.C.C. § 2-313, comment 4.
-R.C.M. 1947, § 87A-2-714 (1).
MU.C.C. § 2-314, comment 13.
57Supra note 28; Petterson v. George H. Weyer, 189 Kan. 501, 370 P.2d 116 (1962).
'U.C.C. § 2-715, comments 2 and 4.
'Assuming that the driver was not traveling at such a speed that he misused the
tires beyond a point which the seller could reasonably foresee. Some courts classify
such careless use as contributory negligence. E. G. Maironio v. Weco Products Co.,
214 A.2d 18 (N.J. 1965), where damage was caused through careless handling of a
tooth brush container. True product misuse arises where the goods are used in a
different manner than the seller could foresee. See also McCready v. United Iron and
Steel Co., 272 F.2d 700 (10th Cir. 1959), where, in a negligence action, a manu-
facturer was held not liable for injuries caused when construction workers used
window frames as ladders.
-R.C.M. 1947, §§ 87A-2-718, 87A-2-719.
-R.C.M. 1947, § 87A-2-316.
1967]
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ability or fitness. 62 The modification of the express warranty is the lim-
itation of recovery to repair or replacement costs. The modification
clause will probably be held ineffective if a breach results in personal
injury since the Code states that modification of remedies in the sale
of consumer goods is prima facie unconscionable when it limits or negates
damages for injury to the person.6 3 Although a seller is free to disclaim
warranty liability, he must do so by disclaiming all warranties, not by
limiting the amount of his liability64 and even a complete disclaimer
may not protect a seller because a court may refuse to recognize it if it
is unconscionable.6 5
Under the Uniform Commercial Code, when a warranty extends to
future performance, the cause of action accrues at the time of injury
unless the "breach is or should have been discovered." 66 Although the
Code makes no provision for a tort statute of limitations, it provides that
a warranty action will toll the regular statute, thus permiting a future
tort action.67
The framers of the Uniform Commercial Code comment that its
provisions are "not intended to enlarge or restrict the developing case
law on whether the seller's warranties, given to his buyer who resells, ex-
tend to other persons in the distributive chain .. ."68 The reference to
developing case law indicates that court decisions69 as well as legislative
acts may be the basis for eliminating the requirement of privity within
the distributive chain. This extension must be distinguished from war-
ranties extended to those outside the chain who are not buyers, and who
have no contractual relationship, yet may be covered by warranty. Such
outside coverage was expressly provided in the Code by extending war-
ranties to the buyer's household and to his guests. 0 Beyond this, the
Code is neutral, stating that "sections of this Article are not designed in
"R.C.M. 1947, § 87A-2-316 provides that exclusion or modification of implied war-
ranties must be conspicuous when it is in writing; and that the implied warranty
of fitness must always be excluded in writing.
IR.C.M. 1947, § 87A-2-719(3).
8 R.C.M. 1947, § 87A-2-719 (3), dealing with modification of remedies, states that the
seller is free to disclaim warranties in the manner provided in § 2-316. Combined
with the comments to § 2-316, it is clear that the seller must disclaim the warranty
rather than modify the remedy for breach.
'U.C.C. § 2-302, comment 1 provides that one test shall be whether, in the light of the
general commercial background and the commercial needs of the particular trade or
case, the clauses are so one-sided as to be unconscionable under the circumstances
at the time of the making of the contract.
-R.C.M. 1947, § 87A-2-725(2). R.C.M. 1947, § 87A-2-607(3) (a) provides that notice
of breach must be given within a reasonable time. Where there is no privity of
contract between the seller and injured party it has been held that no notice is
required. Lonzrick v. Republic Steel Corp., 1 Ohio App.2d 374, 205 N.E.2d 92 (1966);
Wilson v. Modern Mobile Homes, Inc., 137 N.W.2d 144 (Mich. 1965); Tomczuk v.
Town of Cheshire, 26 Conn.Supp. 219, 217 A.2d 71 (1965).
6 7 
.C.M. 1947, § 87A-2-725(3). If the tort cause of action expired between com-
mencement and termination of the first action, the tort action must be commenced
within six months of the termination date.
'U.C.C. § 2-318, comment 3.
6 Contra, Henry v. Eshelman & Sons, 209 A.2d 46 (R. I. 1965).
7 0R.C.M. 1947, § 87A-2-318.
nU.C.C. § 2-313, comment 2.
[Vol. 28
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any way to disturb those lines of case law growth which have recog-
nized that warranties need not be confined either to sales contracts or
to the direct parties to such a contract.
17
MONTANA LAW
To date, Montana has not ruled on the position taken by the Re-
statement, nor has it stated whether privity will be extended under the
Uniform Commercial Code. However, the Code has made important
changes in Montana warranty law, especially with regard to the implied
warranties of fitness and merchantability. Until the Code became ef-
fective,72 warranty was limited to those transactions enumerated by
statute. 73  The warranty of merchantability covered only those goods
which the buyer did not have an opportunity to examine ;74 while the
warranty of fitness of purpose applied only to those products built for
a special purpose, or provisions sold for domestic use. 75 One case law
exception utilized the Pure Food and Drug Act to extend the warranty
of fitness to others than the contracting parties.7 6 Two cases, based on
the Pure Food and Drug Act, held the seller responsible, regardless of
privity, for damages resulting from the sale of impure food. However,
the cases reached the same conclusion for different reasons. In Kelly v.
John R. Daily Co., 7 7 the plaintiff's husband purchased discolored meat.
Plaintiff became ill and recovered damages from Daily. On appeal, the
court held that the Pure Food and Drug Act established a duty to sell
wholesome meat products, and breaching that duty made the seller liable
in either contract or tort, regardless of privity. The court further held
that there was no contributory negligence, as the plaintiff had no reason
to know the meat was bad. Some years later, the privity question rose
again in Bolitho v. Safeway Stores,7s when plaintiff's son became ill from
contaminated cereal. Although the Pure Food and Drug Act stated that
criminal liability did not attach to retailers who sold food in sealed con-
tainers, the court held that civil liability could attach, and that the Pure
Food and Drug Act created a warranty. In doing so it distinguished a
Maine holding 79 that unless the seller gave an express warranty, there
was no civil liability for violation of the Act.
A number of other jurisdictions hold that warranty liability may be
based on violations of the Pure Food and Drug Act.80 These decisions
7"January 1, 1965. See R.C.M. 1947, § 87A-10-101.
"See R.C.M. 1947, §§ 74-309 et. seq.
"1R.C.M. 1947, § 74-324.
75R.C.M. 1947, §§ 74-316, 74-321.
,
6Mason, Article 2: Sales, a Symposium, Montana Law and the Uniform Commercial
Code, 21 MONT. L. REV. 12-14. (1959).
7,56 Mont. 63, 181 Pac. 326 (1919). There was no attempt to bring in Safeway's
supplier as a party to this suit. This was probably due to the difficulty of obtaining
jurisdiction over an out-of-state defendant at that time.
,1109 Mont. 213, 95 P.2d 443 (1938).
',Bigelow v. Maine Central R. R. Co., 110 Me. 105, 85 A. 396 (1912).
"Supra note 10, at 71-80, 98-101; contra, Flynn v. Growers Outlet, 307 Mass. 373,
30 N.E.2d 250 (1940) ; Howson v. Foster Beef Co., 87 N.H. 365, 189 A. 865
1967] NOTES
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do not consider whether a violation creates tort or contract based war-
ranty liability. The central issue seems to be whether the plaintiff is a
member of the class which the statute protects. "The recognition of a
warranty right of action rests on the public policy of protecting an inno-
cent buyer from harm rather than to insure a contractual right.8 ' There
is no reason why the concept of protection should not extend to the
non-buyer, protecting him from the effects of eating unwholesome food.
This position was approved in dictum in Seaton Ranch Co. v. Montana Vege-
table Oil and Feed Co."2 The court there stated that a seller of provisions
insures the wholesomeness of his product; and that this protection is
extended to the general public by the Pure Food and Drug Act. A vigor-
ous dissent held that warranty is in essence contractual. On rehearing
the court affirmed saying, "When a seller warrants that food is sound
and wholesome, he thereby covenants to make good any defect or loss
incurred by its use by the consumer. This is exactly what is meant by
an insurer of the purity of the product."83
A further issue in Seaton was whether the plaintiff was guilty of
contributory negligence by continuing to use defendant's feed after some
sheep died. The plaintiff maintained he had thought the sheep died from
eating poisonous shrubs. The court held the issue to be one for the jury,
thus by implication allowing contributory negligence as a defense, if the
plaintiff knew or should have known of the risk. As yet, Montana has
not determined whether true contributory negligence is a warranty de-
fense, nor has it taken a stand on privity under the U. C. C.
There is precedent in Montana to abrogate the defense of privity in
both contract and tort. Daily established the tort doctrine that a breach
of statutory duty creates warranty liability. The Uniform Commercial
Code requires that goods be fit and merchantable ;84 therefore, breach of
warranty proves breach of that duty, making the seller liable. Although
the Code states that it is the buyer who receives the warranty,8 5 the
comments to the Code make it clear that warranties can be extended
through court decisions.86 In many instances, an injured third party
falls within the group whom a seller could reasonably anticipate as a
purchaser; but if warranty protection is limited to actual buyers, the
result is that the seller's duty is limited, and those whom the law intended
(1937). This rule is generally applied in negligence actions. See 38 Am. JUR.
Negligence §§ 158 et. seq.; however, negligence and warranty are both civil actions.
The controlling issue should be compensation to the injured party as opposed to
punishing the defendant. If the purpose is compensation for one protected by statute,
then a civil action in warranty should be allowed.
slSupra note 3, at 614.
"
2Seaton Ranch Co. v. Montana Vegetable Oil and Feed Co., 123 Mont. 396, 217 P.2d
549 (1949) (dissenting opinion).
'Supra at 559.
8
'Supra note 47.
'Supra notes 45, 48. However, R.C.M. 1947, § 87A-2-314, which creates the implied
warranty of merchantability, does not specify a buyer as such. See note 47 supra.
'Supra note 71.
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to be protected are without a remedy in warranty. The privity problem
would remain if the court should hold that warranty actions are in es-
sence contractual. However, warranty may still be extended under the
reasoning in Bolitho, which held that one who fell within the purview
of a statute designed to protect him became a party to the warranty.
When a third person falls within a class which the Uniform Commercial
Code protects, he should become a party to the warranty contract . 7
The negligence rationale employed in Baumgartner v. National Cash
Register"8 could also be used to eliminate the privity requirement. In
Baumgartner, the plaintiff was an employee of Safeway Stores. She
suffered an electrical shock from a cash register owned by Safeway, but
maintained and repaired by National Cash Register pursuant to a con-
tract with Safeway. No evidence of negligence was shown other than
that the wire which grounded the machine had been broken. National's
defense was testimony that the ground wires were frequently bumped
by wastebaskets and jarred loose. The judge instructed the jury on
res ipsa loquitur. The jury found for the plaintiff and National appearel.
The res ipsa instruction was held to be proper on appeal because the
injury was found to be caused by a faulty machine; the court stating,
"[I] f the machine had been properly grounded the accident would not have
happened." The court further held that physical control of the register
was not needed, saying ". . .it would be far better, and much confusion
would be avoided, if the idea of 'control' were discarded altogether, and
if we were to say merely that the apparent cause of the accident must
be such that the defendant would be responsible for any negligence con-
ncted with it."' 9 The court continued, ". . .this does not mean that the
possibility of other causes be eliminated altogether, but only that it be
shown that the greater probability lies at the defendant's door."90
Although the jury can always reject the res ipsa inference, they may
well find as they did in Baumgartner, that the inference outweighed
the defendant's evidence of due care. All that was needed to sustain the
instruction in Baumgartner was that the greater probability of negli-
gence lay at the defendant's door, and that the defendant had exercised
control at some time prior to the injury.
Baumgartner may be distinguishable because the plaintiff was em-
ployed by a contracting party. However, the court assumed that the
maintenance contract established a duty not to be negligent toward those
within the foreseeable risk area. Thus, Baumgartner can also stand for
the proposition that a contract can impose an affirmative duty which
extends to third persons.
I'Supra note 78.
'8146 Mont. 346, 406 P.2d 686 (1965).
"Id. at 690, quoting PROSSER, TORTS 225 (3rd ed. 1964).
'Ibid., quoting 2 HARPER & JAMES, TORTS § 19.7, at 1086 (1956).
1967]
11
Pedersen: Notes
Published by The Scholarly Forum @ Montana Law, 1966
MONTANA LAW REVIEW
Regardless of whether warranty actions sound in contract or tort, it
is necessary to (1) prove a defective product, (2) a causal relation be-
tween the fact and the injury. The problem of proof troubled the Mon-
tana Court when they were confronted by Mr. Jangula's rubber boots.-'
Jangula, a Butte copper miner, suffered from atopic dermatitis allegedly
caused by wearing boots manufactured by defendant. Suit was instituted
alleging both negligent manufacture and breach of warranty. On appeal
from a plaintiff's verdict, the court held that was no proof of negligent
manufacture, harmful or irritant substance, proximate cause, or medical
causation. The court also considered plaintiff's cross-appeal on the dis-
trict court's ruling which sustained a demurrer to the warranty action.
Plaintiff there argued that it was not necessary to show a defective
product if a simple common sense inference could be drawn by the jury;
and that this inference, coupled with medical testimony that there was a
causal relationship between the product and the injury would be suf-
1 -1n proof thkat a,. Implid warrantywas breached.n The0 court dlisosed
of the warranty question by holding there was no privity between the
parties.9 2 At plaintiff's request, a rehearing was granted.
On rehearing, the court came to the same conclusions on negligence,
but looked to the pleadings to determine the warranty issue.9 3 The initial
complaint had alleged that defendant had expressly warranted the boots;
upon amendment, it "realleged that certain chemicals were negligently
compounded and the boots were of defective workmanship." 94 The court
said no express warranty was established, stating ". . .the fact recital of
(defendant's) distribution methods designed to reach the ultimate user
were national in scope and by means of advertising to create a demand.
It seems obvious that no express warranty could be established by such a
method alleged."95
A few older decisions do hold that advertisements cannot create ex-
press warranties, but they are in the minority. The jurisdictions allow-
ing recovery do so when the advertisement induced the purchase, 96 and
if the buyer relied on the warranty after the purchase.9 7 Advertisements
create express warranties which affirm actual promises made before or
as part of the sale, while the warranties of fitness and merchantability
are implied to the seller at the time of the sale.
9 Jangula v. United States Rubber Co., 147 Mont. 98, 410 P.2d 426 (1966).
"
2Supra. Authority for this position was a single sentence of dicta in Larson v.
United States Rubber Co., 163 F.Supp. 327, 330 (D. Mont. 1958). "Montana
statutes on warranty . . . require privity of contract between the manufacturer and
the person seeking to enforce the warranty . . . . ' The Federal court gave no sup-
porting case law for this position, but it was not necessary as there was judgment
for the plaintiff based on negligence.
"'Supra note 91.
"
tSupra note 91, at 468.
Supra note 91, at 469.
6Cf., Manns v. Macwhyte Co., 155 F.2d 445 (3rd. Cir. 1946).
"Cf., Pritchard v. Liggett & Myers Tobacco Co., 350 F.2d 479 (3rd Cir. 1965), inter-
preting Pennsylvania law; Brown v. General Motors Corp., 355 F.2d 814 (4th Cir.
1966).
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Jangula typifies the position which many courts take when faced
with privity. They circumvent the requirement rather than affirming or
abolishing it. There are four reasons why this is done: (1) Failure to
understand the strict liability concept as applied to defective products;
(2) Fear that eliminating privity will increase law suits; (3) Belief that
industry needs the protection afforded by privity, and (4) Distaste for
a public policy rationale based on risk distribution.
Strict Liability Concept. This terminology is confusing because it has
been used in actions involving defective products as well as those involv-
ing ultra-hazardous products. Strict liability should be used only when
the case concerns an ultra-hazardous product. On the other hand, when
a defective product is involved, a better description would be strict
product liability. The distinction has not always been made clear, and
as a result courts confuse the two liabilities, even though each is a sep-
arate legal doctrine of strict liability. One controlling an ultra-hazardous
instrument or manufacturing an ultra-hazardous product is responsible
for all damages resulting from its use, regardless of any negligence or
the absence thereof on the part of the controller or manufacturer. But
under the doctrine of strict product liability, there must have been a
reliance on the seller's express or implied assurance. Because strict lia-
bility does not require this proof, a court thinking only in such terms
would hesitate before eliminating privity in product liability cases.
Danger of Increased Law Suits. Courts fear that strict products
liability will cause more law suits to be initiated, but the record does not
bear this out. In Montana, for example, strict product liability was estab-
lished for food in 191998 and since that time there has been only one other
reported case in this area-in 1938.11 Even those jurisdictions which have
completely eliminated the privity requirement do not show a large in-
crease in product liability cases.
Industry Protection. The food industry exemplifies the incorrectness
of this position. Foods have been subject to strict product liability for
a number of years, yet the industry continues to grow and prosper. The
argument against industry protection was expressed succinctly in a recent
Pennsylvania opinion:
Throughout the entire history of the law, legal Jeremiahs have
moaned that if financial responsibility were imposed in the accom-
plishment of certain enterprises, the ensuing litigation would be great,
chaos would reign and civilization would stand still. It was argued
that if railroads had to be responsible for their acts of negligence, no
company could possibly run trains; if turnpike companies had to pay
for harm done through negligence, no roads would be built; if mu-
nicipalities were to be financially liable for damage done by their
motor vehicles, the treasuries would be depleted. Nevertheless lia-
bility has been imposed in accordance with elementary rules of jus-
tice and the moral code, and civilization in consequence, has not been
bankrupted, nor have the courts been inundated with confusion. 100
'3Kelley v. John R. Daily Co., 56 Mont. 63, 181 Pac. 326 (1919).
O'Bolitho v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 109 Mont. 213, 95 P.2d 443 (1939).
" Doyle v. South Pittsburg Water Co., 414 Pa. 199, 199 A.2d 875, 884 (1964), holding
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Public Policy Rationale. The rationale that the risk should be allocated
to the enterprise could logically be extended to include losses not caused
by a defective product. However, there is another public policy rationale
based on the deterrent effect; by making the seller liable for defective
products, quality will be improved and the consumer protected. It is
submitted that the deterrent rationale is the better because there is no
real danger that it will be extended to all phases of industry, yet it
has the same effect as spreading the risk.
CONCLUSION
Justice John C. Harrison, concurring in Jangula, stated "I do not
believe that the doctrine of privity should be a shield against a breach
of warranty action." 10 ' Many states, particularly those with large popu-
lations, have abrogated the privity requirement.
It is submitted that existing case law can support tort actions by con-
sumers who rely directly or indirectly on a seller's express or implied
warranties. By sustaining such actions, the Montana courts would not
only protect state citizens, but do away with the tortuous decisions which
result when it becomes necessary to interpret law that sounds in tort yet
carries an implication of contractual relationship.
ALDEN PEDERSEN.
that a private water company was liable for fire damages to a city resident when the
company negligently maintained a fire hydrant.
"
1
'Supra, note 91 at 471.
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